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COPYRIGHT LAW AND CABLE TELEVISION*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years Congress has made several attempts to revise the Copy.
right Act of 1909.1 One of the reasons for the failure to produce a new
statute has been the difficulty encountered in drafting provisions govern-
ing the use of copyrighted material by community antenna television sys-
tems (CATV). The growth of CATV in recent years has been stagger-
ing, and copyright owners, broadcasters, and CATV operators have been
lobbying extensively to influence Congress in its final selection of a revised
copyright act. A recent Senate bill' has been the focal point of their
latest efforts. At hearings before a Senate subcommittee4 representatives
of all three groups appeared and advanced persuasive arguments in sup-
port of their respective interests.
The various viewpoints of these diverse interests can be better under-
stood through an examination of the underlying principles of copyright
legislation. Two overriding purposes can be identified: (1) the encour-
agement of literary creativity and (2) the promotion of the dissemination
of knowledge to the public.: The second of these is paramount, but it
is obviously dependent upon the first.
Copyright owners and broadcasters, emphasizing the first, argue that
the best way to encourage creativity is to guarantee the protection of their
economic interests by compelling CATV operators to pay royalties for the
use of their copyrighted work. CATV operators emphasizing the second,
argue that their service can provide viewers a greater variety of television
programs only if they can expand operations without the burden of pay-
ing excessive royalties. It is evident that in this situation the two pur-
poses are in conflict. Traditionally, similar conflicts have been resolved
through compromise,7 and in terms of maximizing the attainment of the
purposes of copyright legislation a compromise must likewise be reached
between copyright owners and the cable television industry.
* This paper was submitted as an entry in the 1974 Nathan Burkan Memorial Comped-
tion of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
1 17 U.S.C. § 1 etseq. (1970).
2 In 1971 there was a 21.5% increase in subscribers served and a 24.6% increase in oper-
ating systems. 1972 gains, although unofficial, appeared to be even better. See Hearings on
S. 1361 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Comm, on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 297 (1973) [bereinaiter cited as Hearings).
3 S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
4 Hearings, supra note 2.
5 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.1 (1974).
6 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
7 See generally H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909).
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Many feel that only a legislative compromise will resolve the current
conflict. Recent court decisions and the regulations promulgated by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have only served to compli-
cate the issue. The new Senate bill attempts to achieve a workable solu-
tion,8 and its adoption would best serve the purposes of copyright legis-
lation. It will be the purpose of this note to critically review both FCC
regulations and judicially evolved standards applicable to cable television
systems including the effect of more recent decisions. The note will also
offer criticism and suggested revisions of the most recent congressional
proposal for a revised copyright act.
II. LITIGATION CONCERNING CATV
The central issue in the cases involving CATV and copyright liability
is whether a cable system broadcast to subscribers constitutes a "perform-
ance" of the copyrighted work thereby subjecting the broadcast to the
exclusive rights provisions of the Copyright Act. Since the Supreme
Court had decided what would constitute a "public performance for
profit" long before CATV came into existence, it is necessary to review
the early "performance" cases.
A. The Right to Perform Cases
A "performance" of a copyrighted work was originally envisioned in
the context of a theatrical or musical production. However, technologi-
cal advances have expanded the concept of "performance" far beyond
that contemplated by the drafters of the 1909 Act."0 In Jerome H. Rem-
ick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co."' it was held that the
Copyright Act may be applied to situations not anticipated by Congress
if the situation in question is within the theoretical ambit of the statute.
In that case, the owner of the copyright on a song attempted to enjoin a
radio station owner from playing the song while advertising other prod-
ucts it manufactured and sold. The court held that although the radio
8 It is unlikely that the House of Representatives will take any action on the bill during
the 93d Congress. However, proponents in the Senate say that if the legislation dies this year,
an identical bill can be introduced early next year. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 1974 at 4,
col. 1. Several other proposed revisions have died in Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 11947, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 1006, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966); H.tR 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
9 Copyright infringement occurs when one violates an exclusive right of the copyright owner.
The right to perform the copyrighted material is one of the exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 1
(1970).
20 See H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909).
115 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925).
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listeners could not communicate with each other and were not assembled
together, there was a "public performance" of the song.12
The Remick court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Herbert
v'. Shanley Co.13 to establish that the "performance" was for profit. Her-
bert held that the performance of a copyrighted song by an orchestra em-
ployed by a hotel to entertain its patrons without charge constituted a
"performance for profit" and therefore entitled the copyright owner to
royalties when the song was played.1" The Court reasoned that the music
was provided as part of the overall service of the hotel and thus was "for
profit."
The "performance" case which is most analogous to CATV litigation
is Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co.' Jeu'ell-LaSalle dealt with the relay
of a radio program received on a master radio receiving set operated by
the owner of the LaSalle Hotel to all the hotel rooms. One of the pro-
grams received and relayed was transmitted by William Duncan, operator
of a commercial broadcasting station. The American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) informed Duncan and the hotel
that unless licenses were obtained, the broadcasting of any copyrighted
songs owned by one of its members would not be permitted. Such a song
was broadcast by Duncan, received by the hotel, and piped into the rooms.
ASCAP then sued for injunctive relief and damages for infringement.
The district court held that the LaSalle Hotel did not "perform" the song
within the meaning of the statute. After appeal to the court of appeals,
the following question was certified to the Supreme Court:
"Do the acts of a hotel proprietor, in making available to his guests,
through the instrumentality of a radio receiving set and loud speakers
installed in his hotel and under his control for the entertainment of his
guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical composition which has been
broadcast from a radio transmitting station, constitute a performance of
such composition within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. Sec. 1 (e) ?"10
The Court held that the LaSalle Hotel was "performing" the songs
by piping them to the individual hotel rooms. Justice Brandeis, writing
for the majority, analogized the situation to another type of performance
-the playing of a phonograph record: "The modulation of the radio
waves in the transmitting apparatus, by the audible sound waves is com-
12 Id. at 412.
13 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
14 Id. at 594-95. A companion case to Herbert involved the performance of a copyrighted
song by singers on a stage in a restaurant. It was resolved in the same manner. Id. at 594.
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 107.32 (1974).
15283 U.S. 191 (1931).
a6id. at 195-96.
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parable to the manner in which the wax phonograph record is impressed
by these same waves through the medium of a recording stylus." 17  The
Court recognized that both situations require complicated machinery to
enable one to hear the program and in neither situation is the original
program heard. Rather a reproduction is heard and that reproduction
constitutes a "performance." ''
The reasoning of Justice Brandeis is criticized by Professor Nimmer.
He notes that playing a phonograph record is a "performance" only be-
cause of the specific statutory language of § 1 (e) of the Copyright Act."0
Professor Nimmer argues that unlike the playing of a phonograph record
the language of § 1(e) should not be applied in denominating as a "per-
formance" the reception of a radio broadcast.-  He notes that playing a
phonograph differs from receiving a radio broadcast in that the former
involves sounds heard at different points in time (the original recording
session compared with playing the record), whereas the latter involves
sounds simultaneously heard at two different geographic points (the
actual broadcast compared to hearing it on the radio); the latter being
very similar to a public address system which permits a single perform-
ance to be heard over a greater area.2 '
The Jewell-LaSalle opinion noted that if Duncan had obtained a li-
cense to broadcast the copyrighted songs, an implied license might have
justified the reception and distribution by the hotel-.2 " However, an im-
plied license was not found in Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers, Inc. v. New York Hotel Statler Co. 23 wherein several radio
stations had obtained a license to broadcast copyrighted songs which were
relayed to hotel guests as in Jewell-LaSalle. The contracts provided that
the licensee could not expressly or by implication, grant to others the right
to "perform" the songs. The court in Statler denied the existence of an
implied license running to the hotel owner due to the existence of the
express contractual restrictions and held that the copyrights were in-
fringed. 4 Notably, the question of the existence of an implied license
17 Id. at 200.
18 Id. at 201.
19 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970): "[ro make any arrangement or setting of it or the melody of
it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of the author may be
recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced .... "
2 0 NImmEP ON COPYRIGHT § 107.41 at 409-10 (1974).
211d. § 107.41 at 410.
22 283 U.S. at 199 n. 5.
23 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
24 Notwithstanding the provisions in the contract, if the implied license is implied in aw,
even such express reservations should have no effect. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 107.43
(1974). Thus the majority in Statler arguably reached an incorrect result based on the erro-
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in the absence of such express contractual restrictions was left unan-
swered. Moreover, it should be noted that the Supreme Court has never
decided whether the implied license theory would obviate infringement.
Despite contrary argument, case law clearly establishes that providing
the equipment to enable customers to listen to copyrighted material con-
stitutes a "performance" of that material in violation of § 1 of the Copy-
right Act. This is so regardless of the novelty or complexity of the equip-
ment.25 How cable television would fit into this scheme was a problem
soon confronted by the courts.
B. The Fortnightly Case
The Fortnightly Corporation operated cable systems in Clarksburg and
Fairmount, West Virginia. Due to the mountainous nature of the region,
the residents of these areas could not obtain clear reception of program-
ming originating in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Steubenville, Ohio or
Wheeling, West Virginia despite being fairly close to these cities. Fort-
nightly set up large antennas on hilltops a short distance from the cen-
ters of Clarksburg and Fairmount to receive television broadcast signals
coming from the other three cities. The signals were then transmitted
through coaxial cables, strung on utility poles, and other "house drop"
cables to the subscribers of the company. Fortnightly did not edit or
select the programs and did not know what programs would be shown
at any given time.
United Artists Television, Inc. (UATV) owned the copyrights on
several motion pictures which were televised by the three stations. Fort-
nightly received the signals from the stations and carried them to its sub-
scribers by the cable system. UATV alleged, inter alia, that this consti-
tuted an unlicensed "public performance for profit" in violation of the
Copyright Act. Fortnightly answered by claiming that it had not "per-
formed" any of these motion pictures. The district court ruled in favor
of UATV2 and was affirmed by the court of appeals. -'7 Both courts were
simply following a long line of precedent which had withstood numerous
prior challenges. Notwithstanding these precedents, the Supreme Court
reversed.28
Justice Stewart's majority opinion emphasized that Fortnightly clearly
did not "perform" the copyrighted works "in any conventional sense of
neous belief that the existence of express reservations would prevent the finding of an implied
license.
25 See gencraly Harms, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 163 F. Supp. 484 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
26255 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
27 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967).
28 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
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that term, or in any manner envisaged by the Congress that enacted the
law in 1909."'  He did recognize, however, that the statutory language
must be read in light of technological progress,a" and therefore, that the
conversion of electronic signals into images on a television screen could
conceivably constitute a "performance."
In applying this new interpretation to Fortnightly the Court rejected
the "quantitative contribution" test employed by the court of appeals and
replaced it with a "functional" test. The question which must be asked
is not "how much did the [cable system] do to bring about the viewing
and hearing of a copyrighted work,":' but rather whether the cable system
performs the function of a viewer or a broadcaster.3 -' The broadcaster
actively "performs" the work exhibited, the viewer is merely a passive
beneficiary."3 The Supreme Court held that under this test the cable sys-
tem was more like a viewer than a broadcaster. It did not "broadcast or
rebroadcast" any programs; it did not select which programs would be
broadcast; and it did not edit any of the programs broadcasted. Instead
the cable system merely made it possible for viewers to receive the signals
broadcast by the stations in Pittsburgh, Steubenville and Wheeling, which
was no more than any other viewer could have done for himself, if he was
willing to make the effort. Since there was no "performance" of the copy-
righted motion pictures, there could be no copyright liability."4
The Fortnightly decision is directly contrary to the cases discussed
above, especially Jewell-LaSalle. However, the Court did not overrule
Jewell-LaSalle, nor did it attempt to distinguish the case.-' It simply ex-
plained that the "questionable 35-year-old decision"" ' must be "limited
to its facts."3' Others have enunciated grounds on which the cases could
have been distinguished;38 however, the Court would have been much
-I Id. at 395 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1909) ).
301d. See Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. American Automobile Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411,
412 (6th Cir. 1925).
3' 377 F.2d at 877.
a32 392 U.S. at 398-99.
33 Id.
34 17 U.S.C. § 1 (d), (e) ( 1970). Nimmer points out that it could be argued that cable
systems infringe other exclusive rights under § 1. However, he doubts that the Supreme
Court would uphold any of these arguments. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 107.44 at 414.3..5.
See also Note, CATV and Copyright Liability, 80 HARv. L REV. 1514, 1515-17 (1967).
*'-Reference was made to the implied license theory. 392 U.S. at 396 n. 18. However,
it is difficult to see how that theory is relevant to the issue of whether the copyrighted material
was performed.
3( 392 U.S. at 401 n. 30.
:sr Id. at 396 n. 18.
38 The performances could have been deemed private rather than public because the tele-
vision set belonging to the subscriber of the cable system, not the cable system's equipment,
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more logically consistent if it had explicitly overruled Jewell-LaSalle, since
to distinguish the case would have only further confused the issue."0
Justice Fortas noted in dissent that Jewell-LaSalle "stands squarely in
the path of the route which the majority today traverses."40 He believed
that the decision in Fortnightly abandoned the precedents under which
an entire industry had functioned. Without new legislation to take care
of the novel problems brought about by cable television, he could see no
alternative but to follow Jewell-LaSalle.
Justice Fortas criticized the "functional" test as resulting in arbitrary
distinctions between modes of broadcasting; the Fortnightly system is ex-
empted even though it is indistinguishable from other modes which clear-
ly constitute "performances.1 41 Moreover, while cable television might
be no more than "a 'cooperative antenna' employed in order to ameliorate
the image on television" 2 sets situated within a geographical area having
unfavorable topographical features, the situation would be different in a
case where the signals were carried beyond that, area. While Justice
Fortas' reasoning on this point would be applicable to situations involving
distant signal carriage, the fact pattern in Fortnightly involved only local
signal carriage.
C. Teleprompter v. CBS: Distant Signals
In 1964 the creators and producers of copyrighted television programs
brought a suit alleging that a cable system (Teleprompter Corp.) had
infringed their copyrights by making their programs available to the sub-
scribers of the system. Teleprompter Corp. owned and operated antennas
in five different cities and carried the signals received as far as 450 miles.
The suit was initially stayed pending the decision in Fortnightly. After
that case was resolved, the plaintiffs filed supplemental pleadings attempt-
ing to distinguish the two cases. They alleged that Teleprompter's oper-
ations involved the use of the following factors and techniques not pres-
ent in Fortnightly: (1) distant signal transmissions; (2) original pro-
gramming; (3) advertising of programming; (4) program selection;
(5) microwave transmission; (6) interconnection with closed circuit
theaters; and (7) sales of commercials.' The district court held that none
conver:ed the signals into light and sound waves. NIMMER ON COPYIGHT, § 107.44 at 414.4;
Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. RIv. 95, 273 (1968).
39 If the distinction mentioned in note 38 supra was coupled with the Court's reasoning
in Fortnightly the result would be that both the television station and the home audience func-
tion as a broadcaster while the cable system functions as a viewer,
40 392 U.S. at 406 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 407. A television camera at a live presentation performs the same function as a
spectator's eye.
421d.
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of these were sufficient to cause the transmissions to be deemed "per-
formances" and dismissed the complaint.4:'
The Second Circuit agreed with respect to six of the techniques but
reversed the lower court on the ground that the importation of distant
signals constituted a "performance" and rendered Teleprompter liable for
copyright infringement.44
Recognizing that Fortnightly had not determined whether importing
distant signals constituted a "performance," the court reasoned that when
a cable system performed a service which its individual customers could
not undertake themselves, the system was functioning as a broadcaster
rather than a viewer. The court felt that Teleprompter was not merely
enhancing "the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals,""
which under normal conditions would have been received by the viewers,
but was displaying for profit, and without a license, a copyrighted work
to a public which could not otherwise have viewed it.40
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Second Circuit.4 The
Court explained that once a broadcaster transmits a program, its content
has been made available for simultaneous viewing and hearing by the
public. The signals, said the Court, could be received and converted into
sights and sounds by anyone. In applying the functional test, the major-
ity concluded that the rechanneling of the signals, even those originating
from a distant source, was a viewer function rather than a broadcaster
function. Teleprompter could not be held liable for copyright infringe-
ment.
Justice Douglas, one of three dissenting justices, argued that the Court
was invading the province of the legislature. It was clear to him that
despite the majority's conclusion to the contrary, Teleprompter was func-
tioning as an ordinary broadcaster. a
Because television signals travel in straight lines, the curvature of the
earth has created separate television markets. Cable systems, by import-
ing distant signals, are able to invade these markets with programming
from other market areas. When they do, they are effectively "broadcast-
ing" the program into a new market. Justice Douglas thought that these
"acts of piracy are flagrant violations of the Copyright Act."4" To say
4 355 F. Supp. 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
44 476 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1973). The court of appeals did not think that any of the other
new techniques employed by Teleprompter were sufficiently different from those used by Fort.
nightly to necessitate a different ruling.
4' ,Id. at 350 (quoting 392 U.S. at 399).
4f' Shortly after this decision the new Senate Bill (S. 1361) was introduced.
47 Te!eprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
-18415 U.S. at 416-19 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
-9Id. at 418.
1974]
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that there is no violation, he asserted, makes the Copyright Act nonex-
istent in relation to cable television. Whether or riot this is good public
policy is not a decision to be made by the judiciary; instead, it is a legisla-
tive decision.50
III. FCC REGULATION
Teleprompter enabled cable systems to carry broadcaster signals into
the homes of their subscribers without ever being liable for copyright in-
fringement. However, the path was not entirely clear for cable systems,
since they still had to contend with FCC regulations. Although the FCC
lacked the power to hold the cable television companies liable for copy-
right infringement, it could severely restrict their carriage of signals
through its licensing authority.
With the rapid growth of the cable television industry, copyright own-
ers and broadcasters, anxious to protect their own interests, exerted in-
creasing pressure on the FCC to promulgate regulations which would re-
strict cable television's expansion." The Commission, cognizant of the
threat which cable television presented to small, independent broadcast
stations, and anxious to promote the growth of local independent stations,
responded by promulgating regulations in two areas: signal carriage and
exclusivity.5 2
A. Signal Carriage
The rules regulating signal carriage require that cable systems carry
some broadcast stations and prohibit them from carrying others. Since
1965 several sets of regulations have been promulgated."3 Some had a
serious crippling effect on the growth of cable systems"4 and many were
made more stringent in response to favorable court decisions.
50 Id. at 419.
51 See, e.g., Hearings on S. Res. 224 and S. 376 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 6 ( 1957); S. REP. No. 928. 86th Cong., 1st Sess,
(1959); Hearings on H.R. 12914, H.R. 13286, and H.R. 14201 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
" See In re Inquiry into the Impact of Community Antenna Systems, Television Transla.
tors, Television "Sa:ellite" Stations, and Television "Repeaters" on the Orderly Development
of Television Broadcasting, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959); Chazen and Ross, Federal Regulation of
Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L REV. 1820 (1970).
The FCC has authority to regulate broadcasting by virtue of the Communications Act of
1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). See also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157 (1968) (FCC has authority to regulate cable television).
53 5ee First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965); Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.
2d 725 (1966); Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C. 2d 417
(1968).
54 See Chazen and Ross, supra note 52, at 1827; Cable Snarl, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 15,
1972, at 7.
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The current regulations have varying requirements depending on the
size of the broadcast area served. Cable systems in the first fifty major
television markets must carry the following: (1) the signals of broadcast
stations within whose specified zone the system is located;" (2) "nlon-
commercial educational television broadcast stations within whose Grade
B contours the community of the system is located . . .. "" and (3) com-
mercial television broadcast stations that are significantly viewed in the
community in which the system is located.n7 Upon compliance with these
and certain other requirements,"x the cable system may import any missing
full network station, subject to the requirement that it be either the near-
est station or the nearest station within the state. "o Importation of inde-
pendent stations is also regulated. If less than three local independent
stations are in operation, distant independent stations may be imported so
that a total of three are available to subscribers. 00 Cable systems in the
second fifty major television markets are governed by the same rules ex-
cept that a total of only two independent stations may be available to sub-
scribers.6 '
The carriage rules give broadcasters in communities served by cable
systems a great deal of protection by restricting the number of signals im-
ported, and hence, the competition. In addition, audience size is maxi-
mized by demanding carriage of local stations' signals.
B. Exclusivity
Exclusivity guarantees to qualifying broadcast stations the right to be
the only source of programming in some situations, thereby preventing a
decrease in the market share of these stations from the importation of the
same signals via cable. Exclusivity is granted for both network and syn-
dicated programming.
Network exclusivity concerns only the programming supplied by a na-
tional or regional network, not every program shown on a network sta-
tion."' Cable systems must refrain from simultaneously duplicating sig-
5547 C.F.R. § 76.61(a)(1) (1973).
-1;Id. § 76.67(a) (2). Grade B contour is defined at id. § 73.683(a).
57Id. § "76.61(a) (5). See aho id. § 76.5(k).
, For other requirements on the signal carriage of the first fifty major television markets
see, id. § 76.61 (a) (3), (4). See also id. § 74.701.
9 Id. § 76.61(b)(1). The qualification is known as the "leapfrog rule."
Any cable system that was operating in compliance with FCC regulations on January 20,
1968, need not eliminate any station it carried which it would be prohibited from carrying
under the latest regulations. Id. § 76.65.
6Old. § 76.61(b)(2).
1 Ild. § 76.63.
62d. § 76.5(o).
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nals of~lbwer priority stations if a higher priority network station in the
zone which encompasses the community served by the system is broadcast-
ing the same network signals and notifies the cable system."' A station's
priority is determined by its signal strength and its location in relation to
the community served by the cable system."4
Syndicated exclusivity encompasses all programming available in more
than one market for television broadcasts, with the exception of live pres-
entations.6 5 Because it is unlikely that these programs will be broadcast
simultaneously, the regulations provide time limits during which the pro-
gram cannot be carried by a cable system. In the first fifty major televi-
sion markets a cable system may not carry a syndicated program licensed
to a local broadcaster for a period of one year from the grant of such li-
cense."' In all major television markets programs cannot normally be
carried by a cable system if a local station has exclusive broadcast exhibi-
tion rights."7
Exclusivity protects local broadcasters by preventing dilution of their
audience. Since advertisers pay according to the projected number of
viewers, exclusivity and signal carriage regulations bolster the economic
position of broadcast stations; but the effect on cable systems is devastat-
ing. By severely limiting the number of signals and programs which can
be carried, cable television is made much less attractive to the public, thus
diminishing both the number of subscribers and the fee paid by each
subscriber.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION-S. 1361
On March 26, 1973 Senator McClellan introduced S. 1361 which was
then referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Section 111 of that bill
deals with cable television."
A major step toward producing a workable statute was a Consensus
Agreement arrived at by cable system operators, copyright owners, and
broadcasters. The agreement emerged from negotiations sponsored by
the FCC and the Office of Telecommunications." The agreement sup-
ported several measures, including the passage of cable television copy-
031d. §§ 76.91 (a), 76.93. See also id. § 76.95, 76.97.
64 Id. § 76.91(b).
65 Id. § 76.5(p).
661d. § 76.151(a).
67 Id. § 76.151(b).
" S. 1361, supra note ", denominates broadcasting and cable operations as primary and
secondary transmissions, respectively.
(9 Hearings, supra note 2, at 295.
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right legislation."" The legislation was to include copyright liability for
all cable carriage of television signals except for systems with less than
3500 subscribers, compulsory licensing for all local signals and certain
distant signals, and an agreement on a fee schedule or compulsory arbitra-
tion to resolve disputes which might arise. Most of these ideas were in-
corporated into S. 1361.
A. The Statutory Provisions
Section 106 of the bill legislatively overrules Fortnightly and Tele-
prompter by establishing a new definition for "performance." In order
to infringe a copyright under the new bill, one must violate one of the
exclusive rights guaranteed to copyright holders.' The right to "per-
form" is still guaranteed and now includes the showing of any movie or
other audiovisual work in any sequence.-' Because the legislative intent
of Congress to include the activities of cable system operators is very
dear, no court should hold that cable systems are not "performing" the
programs when they carry signals to subscribers. The new bill also codi-
fies the holding of the Remick case-' by providing that a "performance"
is public when members of the public are capable of viewing it individual-
ly or together.74 These definitions make § 111 a clear and effective pro-
vision.
Although § 111 is framed broadly in terms of secondary transmissions,
exemptions limit its impact primarily to CATV operators. Section 111 (a)
exempts the following secondary transmissions from copyright infringe-
ment: relays without charge by hotels, apartment houses, or similar estab-
lishments to private lodgings of guests or residents;- certain educational
broadcasts; 7G secondary transmissions in which the carrier has no control
over the content or selection of the primary system or over the recipients
of secondary transmissions; 77 noncommercial broadcasting;78 and second-
ary transmissions made by a cable system serving a local community prior
70 The full text of the Consensus Agreement is printed at Hearings 307-08 and 37 Fed. Reg.
3341 (1972).
71 S. 1361, supra note 3, § 106. The violation of an exclusive right is a precondition to
an infringement action under the current act also. 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
72 S. 1361, § 101, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1974.
M See notes 11 and 12 supra.
74 S. 1361, supra note 3, § 101.
751d. § 111(a)(1).
7ld. § 111(a)(2).
7Ij. § 111(a)(3).
lSId. § 111(a(4).
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to March 31, 1972, if the cable system is the community's principle means
of access to broadcast signals.7"
Section 111(b) protects broadcasters of closed circuit television pro-
grams by providing that a secondary transmission of such broadcast to the
general public constitutes an infringement of copyright.80
The most important part of the proposed bill with reference to CATV
is § 111(c) which provides for compulsory licensing of secondary trans-
missions. Under this provision an unlicensed secondary transmission, un-
less exempt, is a copyright infringement, and the operator is liable to the
copyright owner and subject to the penalties provided by the bill.81 Sec-
tion 111 (c) (1) states that secondary transmissions are subject to compul-
sory licensing, (if the notice requirements of § 111(d) have been met)
when any local signals are carried, or when distant signals are carried in
compliance with the FCC regulations. Under § 111(c) (2) a secondary
transmission constitutes an infringement of copyright if the carriage of
the signals comprising the secondary transmission is not permitted by the
FCC, - if the cable system has not recorded the notice specified in §
111 (d), 3 or if the carriage of signals comprising the secondary transmis-
sion of a sports event is not permitted under the rules promulgated by
the FCC.84
Section 111 (d) establishes the mechanism through which royalty fees
are paid by cable systems making secondary transmissions. The cable
system is required to file with the Register of Copyright, within thirty
days after the Act becomes effective, or at least one month before its first
secondary transmission (whichever is later), a notice containing informa-
tion relevant to its operations. Thereafter it must submit quarterly re-
ports to the Register listing information pertaining to its subscribers, the
channels it has been carrying and the revenue it has received.85 The roy-
alty fees are computed by taking the applicable percentage of the gross
revenue for the quarter80 The royalty payments are made quarterly to
the Register of Copyright which in turn distributes them to the claim-
ants.17 Thus by enumerating those secondary transmissions which are ex-
791d. § 111(a)(5).
SOld. § 111(b).
811d. § 111(c)(2). Compulsory licensing actually benefits the CATV operators since by
complying with the provisions of the bill it is given the right to carry the television signals
without interference from the copyright owners or broadcasters.
821d. § 111(c)(2)(A).
83Id. § 111(c)(2)(B).
84 Id. § 111(c)(2)(C).
851d. § 111(d)(2)(A).
s6 Id. § 111 (d) (2) (B). The fee schedule is listed in this section.
871 d. § 111(d)(2), (3).
[Vol, 35
NOTES
empt, those which are actionable as infringements and those which are
subject to compulsory licensing, and by creating the framework through
which royalty payments are to be paid, § 11 establishes the rights and
duties of the cable systems in relation to copyright owners and broad-
casters.
B. Suggested Modifications
Although S. 1361 would fill the void now existing in the copyright
law concerning cable television, there are two aspects of the bill which
should be modified: the provisions for royalty fee payments for local sig-
nal carriage and the royalty fee schedule.
1. Royalty Payments
The proposed bill makes no distinction for royalty purposes between
the carriage of local signals and distant signals. While it is a necessary
and welcome innovation to compel cable systems to pay royalties on some
of their operations, it is not clear why they should pay for carrying local
signals, especially since FCC regulations compel them to carry these
signals.
By carrying local signals only, as distinct from also carrying distant
signals, cable systems further both goals of copyright legislation: 8 the
public is exposed to more information and the economic interests of copy-
right owners are not impaired. Through the elimination of geographic
impediments the cable system assures the public in a particular locality of
access to local programs.
In terms of protecting the economic interests of copyright owners, the
Supreme Court pointed out in Teleprompter that the television industry
is compensated in an indirect manner." Advertisers, not the viewers, pay
the broadcasters with rates based on the size of the audience watching the
program. It makes no difference to a sponsor whether his commercial is
seen through a cable system or the conventional medium, and he should
be willing to pay more if a cable system increases the audience. Thus
there is no compelling reason for allowing the broadcaster, if he is the
copyright owner, to reap a windfall in royalties.
The same reasoning negates any claim that copyright owners, who are
not broadcasters, have against cable systems carrying local signals. Since
the broadcaster can expect more revenue from the sponsor for showing
the copyrighted program, he can pay more for the privilege of showing
ss See text at note 5 supra.
89 415 U.S. at 411-12.
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the program, and thus, the copyright owner will obtain a greater eco-
nomic benefit because of cable television.
The above result may be altered when we consider the effect on audi.
ence size of a cable system's carriage of both local signals and distant
signals. In this situation the local broadcasters' viewing audience may
actually be decreased by the cable system's presence. This would be true
if a greater number of viewers are attracted to the imported distant sig.
nals than are exposed for the first time to the local signals carried by the
cable system. However, provision for royalty payments are not justified
on the basis of the potential injury to copyright owners stemming from
the natural competitive effects of a cable system's importation of distant
signals. Disregarding the effects of competition, the only relevant con-
sideration in justifying royalty payments under the Copyright Act is the
effect of a cable system's carriage of local signals.
The arguments which justify payment in the case of distant signal
carriage are not applicable to local signal carriage. Broadcasters often
cannot exact larger advertising fees when their signals are imported into
distant markets because a great deal of advertising is directed solely at
the local community. Thus, the copyright owner cannot expect sizeable
increases in income. At the same time he can expect sizeable losses, since
the distant markets invaded by the cable relay are lost in terms of poten-
tial markets in which to license the copyrighted work. Even if a license
in the potential market is granted it has diminished value since the broad.
cast of the copyrighted work would constitute a second showing.
2. Royalty Fee Schedule
IWhen the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copy-
rights held hearings on the proposed bill, the only aspects of the bill they
discussed were the royalty fee schedule and the blackout of certain pro.
fessional sports." The copyright owners who testified before the com-
mittee expressed concern over the fact that cable operators were not will-
ing to submit the fee schedule for arbitration, as provided for in the
Consensus Agreement."' The cable operators countered by claiming that
current arbitration of the fee schedule would be extremely unfair since
all of the data essential to formulating a fair fee schedule was not yet
available. They pointed out that cable systems had not in the past made
great inroads into the largest television markets and, therefore, fees es.
9 0 Hearings, supra note 2.
91 Id. at 279, 297-98, 380.
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tablished on the basis of current data, collected primarily from rural areas,
would be grossly unfair 2
In fact, the subcommittee's examination of various witnesses indicates
that there was little basis for the fee schedule proposed in S. 1361.'
Thus, it would be unwise to enact the bill until more reliable evidence
can be found to support a fair fee schedule. The findings of the two
studies introduced during the hearings were exactly opposite, and thus,
are of very little value in formulating an equitable fee schedule.
The most reasonable approach would be that suggested in the Con-
sensus Agreement: appoint an independent body to formulate a fair
schedule. Such an independent body could consider the existing data as
well as make reasonable estimates of the projected successes and expenses
of cable systems in urban areas. The result would be a much fairer sched-
ule than one formulated on the basis of either existing data or no data.
Since any fee schedule will be subject to revision every five years, the
economic effects of new developments in the industry will continually be
incorporated into the new fee schedule. 4
V. CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the cable television dispute, the Copyright Act of
1909 does not adequately protect copyright owners in our modern society.
Copyrighted material is being used without the payment of royalties.
Moreover, since the courts were attempting to interpret an imprecise and
outdated law, no logical pattern could be discerned from their decisions.
The FCC had little choice but to intervene on behalf of copyright holders
and broadcasters, with the result that the FCC regulations are much
stricter than would be necessary under the proposed legislation. In order
to remedy this situation legislation similar to S. 1361 should be enacted.
Such legislation would allow copyright holders to collect the royalties
rightfully due for the use of their work, and would remove the doubts
currently plaguing cable television system operators as to proper royalty
fees. Finally, such legislation would allow the FCC to reconsider the
regulations currently restricting the realization of the full potential of
cable television in our society.
92 Id. at 398-99.
93M. at 283-84, 409.
94 S. 1361, supra note 3, § 802.
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